THE
American Journal of Education.

No. VIII.—March, 1857.

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X. MENTAL SCIENCE AS A BRANCH OF EDUCATION.*

BY REV. JOSEPH HAVEN, A.M.,

PROFESSOR IN AMHERST COLLEGE.

I deem it a privilege to address to-day a convocation of Teachers and of the friends of education, convened from all portions of the country in this our noble old Bay State;—a State distinguished from the first for its regard for religion, for liberty, and for education. May the time never come when its attachment to any one of these great principles shall be less.

The vocation of the teacher is one which, viewed in all its relations, is hardly second to any other in honor, and importance. Much is entrusted to him, much required of him. To meet these demands, he must be a man of large and liberal culture, knowing the things which he is to teach, and knowing much besides. Every year enlarges the sphere and carries farther and farther out the boundary line of his dominion, brings new sciences into his field of labor, and elevates the standard of his necessary qualifications. He must teach more things, and he must teach them better. Time was when a few simple elements constituted the amount of his stock in trade. To mention arithmetic, geography, reading, writing and spelling, was to give a complete catalogue of the branches taught in our schools. It is not so now. It will never be so again. In these matters our country never moves backward. The people have discovered that there are many things which it is useful for man on the earth to know, and that they have the right to know them;—the child of the poor man as well as of the rich; in the free school as well as in the academy, and the college; and they mean that he shall know them. At the doors of our public schools, of every higher grade, stand knocking already, an array of sciences that would have astonished the savans of the last generation. Natural Philosophy, History, Physiology, Botany, Chemistry, Astronomy, Physical Geography, and I know not how many other sciences,—all clamoring for admission; and for one I predict they will get in. The people will know these things, and will insist that their own children shall know them, nor is there any reason why they should not know them.

The teacher must keep up with this demand. The tide of public opinion, of public intelligence and information, in a great and free

* An Address delivered before the American Institute of Instruction at its Annual Meeting in Springfield.
nation like our own never sets backward. It moves on and on, and
schools and committees, and teachers advance with it, or are swept
before it.

With this demand for a higher education, a larger and more libe-
ral culture, on the part of those who are to conduct the education of
the young, the teachers of the present day are, to a great extent ear-
nestly and cordially complying. It would be difficult to find, in any
country, a body of men devoted to education, possessing a larger
share of general information, a higher mental culture and training,
men of larger views, and higher aims, than the teachers of the public
schools of New England, and especially of Massachusetts. I say this
without reserve or qualification; I say it with pleasure and pride; I
say it after a careful observation of the school systems of our own
and of other countries.

Among the various branches of useful science, all demanding the at-
tention of the well informed, and well educated man, of the present
day, there is one whose claims to general attention have I fear been
somewhat overlooked in our country. Allow me then the privilege
of directing your attention on this occasion to the importance of the
science of the human mind, as a distinct branch of knowledge, enti-
tled to a high place in the course of study which every true scholar
and every well informed man marks out for himself, and especially
worthy the attention of those who are to guide the education of
others.

I am aware that in presenting such a subject, I may seem to some,
to have forgotten the character and objects of the present association.
What has the science of the human mind to do with schools and
school-teaching, they may ask. This question I will endeavor to an-
swer before I sit down. Unless, however, I do very much mistake the
character of my audience, I see before me to-day men who are de-
termined to omit no effort to attain that discipline of all the mental
powers, that range of thought, that wide and large culture, that shall
best qualify them for their noble work. To such men my theme is
appropriate, and to such I address myself.

Many causes it must be confessed, have hitherto contributed to the
comparative neglect of mental science in our own country.

The nature of the science is such that its benefits are not immedi-
ately apparent. Men, the dullest, and most uneducated, can see some
use in Chemistry, or Botany. They teach how to analyze soils, and
how to raise better crops. Natural Philosophy may be of service to
the mechanic. Physiology well understood, may tend to lengthen
life, and shorten the physician's bill. But what can possibly come of
Mental science, they do not so readily perceive. It has no patent, obvious, practical results to show. Its region of thought lies removed somewhat from the actual observation of men. It has no splendid cabinets or museums to throw open to the gaze of the astonished multitude. It can not point you to its magnificent collections, embracing specimens of all the known varieties of thought and feeling; nor can it illustrate by curious instruments, in brass, and wood, and glass, and iron, and by nice experiments unfold the secret working of the laws of association, or memory, or imagination—all the wonderful alchemy of thought, and of our curious inner life. Its simple pages present not even one poor diagram to catch the eye of the curious.

And then it has no great discoveries to make and to announce, no brilliant rewards to bestow on its votaries. Any man of moderate patience and skill, and a glass of medium power, stands a reasonable chance of discovering a half dozen new asteroids between Mars and Jupiter, the first clear night, and then goes his name ad astra, and then comes, by return mail, a diploma from the royal society, and a gold snuff-box from the crown of Russia, or the crown prince of Serengapatam. Not so in mental science—not even in the present disturbed state of affairs, not in the wildest and most excited political gathering, could one hope to discover several new passions in exercise, or a brace of new intellectual faculties in full play. Or even if you were so fortunate as that, it may be doubted whether the world would even take the trouble to inquire your name, or the Czar think it incumbent on him to provide you with snuff-boxes. But more than all, and as I suppose, the chief obstacle to the more general cultivation of mental science, is to be found in the exclusively practical and active tendencies of the age. We are by nature a stirring, busy, enterprising people, given more to action than to thought. An age of action is seldom also an age of reflection. External life demands the energies of a new people, and a new state. The elements are to be subdued, cities to be built, mountains to be leveled, graded, tunnelled, roads constructed, and a thousand other useful and practical works to be wrought, before the period comes of golden affluence, and leisure, and genial task, and refined culture, which can at once appreciate and reward the higher efforts of scientific investigation. That age will come; but it is not yet. Meanwhile he who devotes himself to a pursuit so little accordant with the more directly practical tendencies of the age, must be content to pursue his way with little encouragement from without, little reward save that of his own highest culture, and the sweet delight of his own conscious advance in that true wisdom, and those
loftier attainments, which like divine truth come not with observation of men.

The causes at which we have now glanced may account in part for the comparative neglect of the science of the mind in our own country. What then are the reasons, if any there may be, why the science of which we speak should be regarded as at least of equal importance with others, in a course of liberal study.

The importance of this branch of education will be apparent, if we consider its relative position with regard to other sciences. As we go forth into the great field of truth, and among the works of God, and begin to explore and observe the things that lie around us, we find indeed nothing unworthy our regard, but not all things equally worthy. The ground on which we tread, and the solid rock, demand and repay our careful investigation; but when we pass from these to the contemplation of vegetable life,—when we turn our eye from the soil to the little flower that grows and blooms upon it, we are conscious of advance, of reaching a higher stage of art, a higher department of creation. Passing on still to the forms of animal existence, we are conscious still of the ascending series. The shell minutely beautiful, that lies by the shore of the deep-sounding sea, and listens ever to its roar, the insect rejoicing in the sun-beam, the thousand forms of life that flutter in the air, and creep the earth, and leap up in the waters, and bound in all the consciousness of freedom, and strength, and vigorous life along the mountains and over the plains, these afford us a higher field of study than mere inanimate existence, however curious and delicate may be its organization. When from these we pass on to observe and study man himself, the lord of this entire creation, when we make his nature, his physical structure, his habits, his languages, his cities, his laws, his arts, his wonderful creations, the objects of our careful study, how much higher have we ascended in the scale of being and in the sphere of our explorations.

But when, turning from all these, we make the mind of man himself our study, we find ourselves at once in a region from which we overlook the whole wide field of previous investigation, and toward which all these other sciences conduct, as different paths along the mountain side, starting from different points, and running in different directions, but all converging toward, and coming out at last upon a common terminus at the summit. That summit and common terminus of sciences is the science of mind. As the mineral, the vegetable, the insect, the animal, in their varied and wonderful organizations, are all and necessarily inferior to man, so is the science of them, however important and useful, of necessity inferior to the science of
man himself; and as the human body, wonderful in its structure, curious in its mechanism and its laws, is nevertheless inferior in dignity and worth to the spirit that dwells within, and is the true lord of this fair castle and domain, so is the science of the body, its mechanism, chemistry, anatomy, laws, inferior to the science of the mind, the divinity within.

Many of the sciences which are justly regarded as among the most noble are themselves the creations of the mind. In some sense all science may be so regarded. The materials furnished by nature are put together and framed into a science by the intelligent mind. In some cases, however, the very materials seem to be the creations of the mind—_instruments which it devises to aid it in its progress, and with which it works upon still higher creations, as a mighty army, in its resistless march, builds the roads, bridges the streams, levels the mountains, to make itself a way._ Of this sort seems to me the science of number and quantity; when duly appreciated, in all its extent, and range, and precision and power, truly one of the most remarkable products of human ingenuity and skill—for such unquestionably it is—a pure creation of the mind. Observe now this man of number and of quantity; how starting with a few self-evident and simple truths, manufacturing out of his own brain and fancy, such simple instruments to aid him, as a point, a line, and a circle, not one of which is ever to be found in the actual, real world, not one of which has any existence save in his own imagination, he goes on to combine and construct with these until he builds up a tower whose top reaches the skies, and from that lofty and impregnable tower, his castle, his fortress, which nothing can shake, from which nothing can drive him, this man, this presumptuous builder, calmly measures off the courses of the stars, and calls their names, and spans their dimensions, and weighs their bulk, and measures their speed, and announces their coming, yet afar off, and with his magic tube follows them in their distant flight through the wilderness of space. Is anything I ask more strange, more admirable than this? Yes, I reply, there is one thing more wonderful even than this, and that is the mind that devised, constructed, and executed this science, and now works with it as its mighty and magic instrument; and he that would observe the most curious and wonderful thing of all, must leave the figures, and the diagrams, the lines and circles, the tubes, and the tables, with which this man works, and study the man himself, the workman.

So also are the creations of art, beautiful, wonderful, as seen in the canvass which warms, and glows, and moves into life and passion as
you gaze, or in the chiselled marble that with serene, calm feature stands and looks upon you, all motionless, all passionless, yet as if cognizant of your inmost being,—an ideal presence drawing you to itself as by a species of enchantment, till a mysterious sympathy springs up between you and it,—this too is wonderful,—this, and the art that can do this. And yet one thing is more so,—the mind that can contrive and execute this work of art.

So is it also, with human language. Take that grandest and most majestic of them all, the Hebrew; take that richest and most finished of them all, the Greek. You have that which may well receive, as it well deserves your closest study, and your warmest admiration. But after all, is it not chiefly interesting as one of the productions of the human mind, illustrating the laws, and developing the hidden structure of that mind? The richness, the affluence, the elegance, the exactness, the beauty, of what are these the qualities? Where did they dwell? In the Greek language, or in the Greek mind? Which is, of the two, the more wonderful and worthy of study, the statue, obelisk, cathedral, with its solemn aisle, and overhanging dome, or the mind that devised and wrought out these things, that saw them when as yet they were not, saw them in all their perfectness as they were to be?—which of the two, the instrument, or the instrument-maker?—which of the two, the Greek language, or the Greek mind, that called into being and use such an instrument of speech? And of which is the science most noble and most worthy of regard?

I admire the genius of a Kepler, a Copernicus, a Newton. I sympathize with their enthusiasm as they develop the laws, and study the movements of the heavenly bodies. I look through the telescope, not without a feeling of awe, as it seems to lift me up, and bear me away into the infinite, and bring me near those stately orbs that beyond the ken of human vision dwell in the silence and unbroken stillness of their own eternity. But there is one thing which fills my whole being with yet a deeper awe and reverence than even those majestic orbs;—that is, the mind that from this, its lowly dwelling on the earth, in all the weakness and the ignorance of its earthly condition, looking out afar into those clear deep spaces, can by patient observation, discover the hidden laws, and spell out the complicated movements of that vast and busy orrery of worlds.

An importance attaches to the science of mind, if we consider, in the second place, its connection with the past, its historic associations. Many of the sciences justly regarded as important, are of comparatively recent date. This is true indeed of most of the natural sciences. Geology, Physical Geography, Zoölogy, Botany, Physiology, Chemistry, are of no remote origin. It is scarcely half a century since some of them
began to assume a strictly scientific form. Go back a few hundred years, and you find the stateliest and most assuming of them either wholly lost in uncertainty of origin, or runn out into fanciful and absurd speculations. Astronomy, a mathematical and not a physical science, may be regarded as an exception to this rule. Yet what was even Astronomy, before Copernicus, and the telescope, and the sixteenth, or even the seventeenth century! Many important facts had indeed been observed and registered before, but the science in anything like its present exactness, and completeness, can scarcely go back to the middle ages. The science of number, and quantity, being, as I have already said, more purely a creation of the mind, was of much earlier origin, and was already fixed in its general principles, and settled on a firm basis, almost at the outset of ancient civilization. But no inquiries were of earlier origin among men, than those pertaining to subjects purely metaphysical. Go back as far as you will toward the Orient, toward the first dawn of a rude and imperfect civilization, you still find men busying themselves with the great problems that to this day remain unsettled. The earliest speculations of the human mind, its first attempts to get beyond the little sphere of activity that immediately surrounded it, and the narrow domain of sense, seem to have assumed this direction Chaldean and Egyptian shepherds, watching their flocks by night, observed the starry heavens, and recorded the movements of the changing constellations. But long ere that, had the question arisen, and been intently pondered by many a reflecting and observing mind, whence came those nightly luminaries, and whence this fair earth, and what its origin, and what the soul of it, and whence and what am I, and my race. These questions, and such as these,—what are they, but the very rudiments and groundwork of philosophy.

It has been said by an ingenious writer, that the man who first discovered that dry wood could be set on fire, deserves to be regarded as the first philosopher. We would by no means detract from the merits of that truly brilliant discovery. The man who made it, certainly deserves a medal, and a monument. And yet we are by no means sure that the palm of original discovery does not rather belong to that other man, who first discovered that there is such a thing as wood, and that it is distinct and different from himself—in other words, that there is matter, and also mind; each subject to its own proper laws, and manner of being. And this I presume must have been a somewhat early discovery in the history of the race.

Indeed, we can hardly imagine a state of human society and civilization so primitive and rude, as to lie back of all inquiry and thought as to the causes and philosophy of things. Far enough from the
truth may have been those primitive hypotheses and speculations, wide of the mark, not unlikely, those primitive inquiries, and laborious patient investigations; but they were the foundations and first beginnings of a science that probably goes further back into antiquity, and has engaged the attention of a greater number of thoughtful, earnest minds since the creation of the world, than any other that can be named. And from the day when such inquiries first presented themselves to the first reflecting and inquiring mind, from that age to this, what earnest reaching forth and striving to grasp the true, the unknown, the infinite, to learn a little of the hidden causes of things, to lift up a little in some way the impenetrable veil that shuts down about us here, and obtain a glimpse of the fair realms that lie beyond.

The student of astronomy, as he watches the heavenly bodies, is carried back to the past, and filled with peculiar emotion, as he remembers that on these same constellations which he now beholds, other eyes fixed their earnest gaze, in those years when the earth was young; beheld them then, as he beholds them now,—Orion, there, and Pleiades, and Taurus, and the varied host; and so in like manner is the student of philosophy linked with remotest ages, and associated with the greatest and richest historic names and periods, when he meditates upon those themes which have tasked the human mind from the beginning, on which the mighty Stagyrite discoursed, walking to and fro, with his disciples, and the noble-souled Plato, and Plato's great master, and the still earlier Greeks of the Asiatic colonies, whose works are mostly lost in the confusion of the ages, and the wreck of time, but who meditated, and doubted, and believed, and taught, upon the very same problems which engage the attention of the student at the present day. He that would hold converse with the noblest spirits of the past, must frequent the paths and explore the fields which were their favorite resort.

The importance of mental science is evident further, from its intimate connection with our own interests, and personal destinies—some sciences interest us as abstractions, merely speculative systems of truth; some as realities, and facts, but of such a nature, so remote from humanity, and the common wants of the race, as to make little appeal to the heart and soul of a man. We are interested in mathematical truth, as in a finely cut and beautiful crystal, every part finished and perfect, just as it existed from of old, before man was upon the earth, or there was any intelligence save that of the Creator to contemplate its beauty. What connection have those eternal and unchangeable truths with man and his affairs. They would have been equally true had he never existed. We observe the movements of
the heavenly bodies, but feel as we so do that those orbs are far beyond us, having no relation to us, ignorant of us, keeping their stately progress even as they moved ages ago, and as they will ages hence. What have we to do with them, or they with us? We watch them as they hold their course through the deep firmament, as children standing on the shore watch the distant moving sail that glides silently along the horizon—so far, so beautiful, so still. Even thus sail those swift ships of the firmament on the wide sea above us, and only He who built them, and who guides their course, knows their history.

But when we come to the study of ourselves, the laws of our own intelligence and consciousness, the problems of our own being and destiny; our investigations assume a practical importance and interest which pertain to no other departments of truth. It is no longer the distant star in the heavens, shining where God placed it ages ago, no longer the sail dimly visible on the far horizon, but our own conscious being, that is the object of our thought. The question is no longer, whence comes that swift ship, whither goes it; but what am I, and whither going, and what freight bear I, myself a swift sailing ship on this ever flowing sea of time,—whither is my destination, and what my history? This mysterious soul which animates me, and is the presiding divinity over all my actions, what is it, with all its faculties—reason, imagination, memory, sense—these varied powers and laws of my being? What is that wonderful change that passes over me, when, no longer in communion with the external world, I am still conscious of existence, and the busy thoughts are active still—that state which men call sleep? And what is that still more dread and mysterious change that must soon pass upon me—that which men call death? How is it that objects, and events, remote in time and space, come back to the mind with all the freshness and reality of the passing moment? What is that principle of my nature that presumes to place itself in opposition to all my inclinations and passions, and lifting its reproving finger, say to me thou shalt, and thou shalt not; and which, when I disobey this command, pursues my steps like a vindictive angel, tracks me over the wide world, fills my whole soul with misery, my whole future being with remorse? What mean I by that little word,—duty,—what by that little word,—ought,—that connects itself so often, and so closely with my pursuits, and my happiness? Ought what, and why ought, and to whom ought? Am I free, or am I under the chain of stern inevitable fate? Are all my actions predetermined, and by whom; if not, then where is Diety, and that superintending Providence that
men say governs all things; if they are, then what can I do other
than what is already determined, and so being no longer free, how is
it that I am responsible? What power and control have I, in a word,
over these restless powers and passions of my own moral being?

These are grave questions. Who shall solve me these problems?
Who shall tell me what I am, and what I am to be? Who shall read
me this strange inexplicable riddle of human life? Whether it can
solve them, or not, these are the questions and the problems, that
mental philosophy discusses, and we perceive at a glance their direct
and practical bearing on the great interests and personal wants of man
as an individual.

The importance of a thorough acquaintance with mental science
appears furthermore from its intimate connection with many of the
practical pursuits and sciences. It may be said to underlie many of
the most important of these pursuits and professions. Even theology,
the noblest and highest of all sciences, because conversant with the
noblest and highest themes, while at the same time most practical, is
itself in a peculiar sense based upon the science of mind. Our philo-
osophy always and of necessity underlies our theology, and shapes in
some measure its character, as the solid strata that lie unseen beneath
the surface give direction, and figure, and altitude to the mountain
range. The facts, the individual truths, the general data, are indeed
given, revealed in nature, and in the divine word;—but not the sys-
tem, not the science; these are to be constructed out of the materials
given, by the thinking, reflecting mind, for itself. The stars are in the
heavens, and the flowers are in the fields, but, it is for man to arrange
and classify them, and not till he has done this for himself, has he a
science of astronomy, and of botany. It is precisely so with the
science of divine truth. Now it is in part, at least, the office of phi-
losophy to gather, arrange and classify the great truths which God has
scattered abroad in nature and in revelation. It falls properly within
her sphere. She has, to say the least, a voice in the arrangement, and
is entitled to be heard. Not to speak of the very idea which we form
of the divine being, borrowed as it is, and must necessarily be, from
our previous idea of the human mind, and of our own spiritual exist-
ence,—not to speak of the several modes of argument by which we
seek to establish, in natural theology, the primary doctrine of the ex-
istence of God,—what questions I may ask go deeper into the ground-
work of any and every theological system, than those pertaining to
the freedom of the will,—the government of the affections, inclina-
tions, and passions of the human soul,—man's power over himself, to
make himself other and better than he is, to do what he has no dis-
position to do, his power in a word to obey all the divine commands. These, however, are questions strictly and purely psychological. You can not stir a step in the application of theology to practice, till you have in some way settled these questions in your own mind, and that will be for the time your science, and your philosophy.

Nor is it theory alone, that must fall back upon philosophy. The physician finds he comes into the practice of his profession, if he never knew it before, that the laws of the human mind are to constitute a most important part of his study and observation. If he desires to succeed in his profession, he must understand the operation of the laws of memory, of association, of imagination; how to avoid and how to touch the hidden springs of thought and feeling; the effect on the bodily organization of the due and of the undue exertion of each of the mental faculties; in fine the whole relation of mind, and its operations, to body, and its functions, with the reciprocal influence of each upon the other. Unless he knows these things he knows not often the real nature of the disease which he blindly undertakes to cure. Its springs and causes lie often back among the laws of the mind. To one who rightly understands the matter, a word fitly spoken, a suggestion, a mere tone of the voice, is often the most potent medicine. For want of this, it not unfrequently happens that the disease, treated according to the most approved rules of the profession, is scientifically cured, while the patient is awkwardly left to die in the process. It is not too much to say, that the field of inquiry and research now pointed out, is one very imperfectly understood, if it be not in part quite generally overlooked by the medical profession.

I need hardly say that to the public speaker, whether at the bar, in the halls of legislation, in the pulpit, or, in the public assembly of whatever kind, and on whatever occasion, a knowledge of the human mind, and an ability to make practical use of that knowledge, is absolutely indispensable. Success in oratory, depends, I admit, on other things, not a little;—the voice, the manner, the theme, the occasion, the personal appearance and bearing of the speaker, the combination and mood of the audience;—but he who best understands the laws and movements of the human mind,—how to touch the feelings, how to awaken the passions, how to excite the fears and the hopes, how to rouse the resentment of his hearers,—how again to soothe the excited feeling, how to allay prejudice, and call into exercise the calm reason and sober judgment of men, he will best be able to effect his purpose, by turning to his own account all the circumstances of the occasion, and like a skillful organist, touching with ease, yet with precision, and effect, what key of the many-voiced instrument he will. No man
can do this who does not understand well the *instrument* on which he plays.

Not to the theologian, the physician, the orator alone, is the science of mind an important auxiliary, if not an indispensable requisite to success. To the teacher it is especially of use, and that in many ways.

It is of use in enlarging his sphere of thought and information. It is necessary for him to know more things than he teaches, or expects to teach. No man is fit to teach spelling and arithmetic, who knows nothing but to spell and to cipher. He may not have occasion to teach Greek or Conic Sections in the village school; but he will have a larger and richer mind for having learned these things, and will be able to teach the most common and simple English branches all the better in consequence. And so of mental science. He may not have a class in metaphysics, but if he have a clear, strong, well disciplined mind himself, in consequence of that intellectual training which such studies afford, he will be a better teacher of whatever he has occasion to teach. His advantage will appear, his gain and position, increase of power, and skill will be manifest in whatever simplest thing he is set to do. He will teach the English alphabet in a wiser and better manner, for it. He may not have a class in Homer’s Iliad, but to read the Iliad will help him to explain the construction of many a sentence in Pope, or Milton, to the juveniles who are laboriously toiling through the darkness and intricacy of English Grammar. He may not have occasion to teach Chemistry, or Geology, or Zoology; but the physical sciences will replenish his mind with ideas, and furnish him useful illustrations with which to enliven the monotony or dullness of the class-book recitation. There is hardly a department, I suppose, of useful learning, which may not be of direct use to the teacher in the manner now indicated. If, as Cicero affirms, it is necessary for the orator to know all subjects in order to speak well upon one, it is at least equally true of the teacher. But there is, perhaps, no one science that tends more directly to enlarge the sphere of mental activity, and at the same time to strengthen and develop the native power of the mind, than the science of the mind itself.

But more especially will this science be of use to the teacher, in the knowledge which it will give him of the mind of his pupil, and the skill in dealing with that mind. The mind of the pupil is the instrument, on which he is set to play—a curious instrument of many and strange keys and stops—and to handle it well and skillfully is no ordinary acquirement. What shall we think of the man who knows nothing whatever of the *instrument*, not one key from another, but only and simply the *music* which he is to perform;—nothing of the
mind which is to be instructed, but only the knowledge to be communicated to it. If the mind of the pupil were like an empty cask, to be filled by tunnell and bucket in the quickest way, being of given capacity, and warranted not to leak, this method of operation might answer every purpose. But as it is, the mind being not at all the sort of thing now supposed, but altogether a different matter, is it not the very first thing in successful teaching to know well the nature and the laws of the mind that is to be taught; how to stimulate, how to encourage, how to restrain, how to control, direct its every movement and impulse.

Do you say this is to be learned not from books, but from intercourse with living men? I admit it, in part, and only in part. The materials of the desired knowledge are to be found everywhere in society, where man is found. And so the materials of botanical science are in the fields. But as I would not send a man into the fields to study botany, without first giving him the principles of the science as taught in the books, so neither would I send him to the streets and the markets to learn the nature and laws of the human mind, without any previous knowledge of the science as unfolded in the treatises of those who have devoted their lives to its study and elucidation.

I have spoken thus far of mental science as useful to the teacher in quickening and enlarging his own mind, and giving him power over the mind of the pupil, rather than as a matter which he is likely ever to be required to teach. But I go further than this, I am not content with this, I urge its claims to a place among the actual studies of the school—at least the school of higher grade. Why should the pupil be ignorant of what it so much concerns every man to know? Why should he learn everything except the one thing, which, of all, it would seem he ought to know, that is, himself? Shall he learn geography, that he may know the country and the state in which he lives; arithmetic, that he may cast an account correctly; astronomy, that he may tell the stars; natural philosophy that he may know the laws of the material universe; and shall he not know the laws and faculties of his own mind? Of these, shall he be left in profound ignorance? Is it of more use to him to know how Kamtskatka is bounded, or what is the largest river in New Zealand, than to know the nature and mutual relations of his own five senses;—to know that a bell will not ring in an exhausted receiver, and why not, than to know why he forgets proper names, and why he remembers one thing better than another, or how it is that he remembers anything at all?

It may be supposed by some that the study of the mind is too abstract and difficult a matter for the comprehension of the pupil at the
age in which we find him at the common school. Doubtless there are many treatises on the science which he would not comprehend, many subjects connected with it which he is not sufficiently mature to master; but to suppose that the simple elements and outlines of the science are beyond his reach, is a great mistake. As to the names and terms employed, they are for the most part already familiar, and do not, for a moment compare in difficulty with the new and difficult words constantly in use in any and every physical science, as botany or physiology, or natural philosophy; while as to the truths contained in the science, they are, to say the least, not less important, not less interesting to the learner, certainly not less simple and easy of acquisition, than those of any other science. Any child that can be taught the complicated processes of multiplication and division of fractions, can be taught the most important truths of mental science, in less time, and with less trouble, both to himself and to the teacher. Let the teacher, in the absence of any suitable elementary treatise, be himself the book. Let him in some moment of leisure from the ordinary occupations of the school-room, such moments as every wise teacher will take care to secure, and to turn to good account, gather a little circle of his pupils around him, and propose to them, for instance, this question or problem,—how many really different sorts of things the mind can do. Their answers at first may be vague, and wide of the mark, but it will not be long ere they assume a definite shape, and presently reach the conclusion, that all the possible forms of mental activity may be reduced to the three distinct departments, of thinking, feeling, and willing. A great step has been taken when even this simple point is reached. Let him again, at another time, direct their attention to the manner in which one thought leads to, or suggests another; how it happens that the sight of Henry’s book, or seat, reminds them at once of Henry; and they will soon find out for themselves what are the great laws of association. In like manner the philosophy of memory, of imagination, of attention, of abstraction, and classification, and other faculties, may be explained. If by the time such an exercise has been twice or thrice attempted, the teacher does not find his pupils becoming somewhat deeply interested in the new science, I will consent that he drop the subject.

My limits forbid me to pursue the subject further. Enough to have thrown out a few suggestions. Enough, if what I have said shall awaken the attention of even one thoughtful earnest mind, desirous of the best attainments for itself, and the highest skill in the noble profession of educating and training other minds, and shall lead it to a more careful study of that science which may be said to lie, in a sense, at the foundation of all others.